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Confrontation, Fidelity, Transformation: The
"Fundamentalist" Judicial Persona of Justice
Antonin Scalia
Tom Levinson*
I. Introduction
Commentators characterize a number of federal judges and legal
academics as "fundamentalists."' In part, the term is used because
religious fundamentalists and their purported legal counterparts share a
similar type of political conservatism. 2  In larger part, though, the
connection is drawn between legal and religious "fundamentalism"
because of the analogous relationship between the legal interpretative
method of textualism3 and the religious fundamentalist's theology-
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1. See CASS SUNsTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005). According to Sunstein, legal fundamentalists consider
themselves to be part of a "movement" that seeks broad, "radical" changes in
constitutional law. Id. at 26, 20. Among the judges tagged by Sunstein as
fundamentalists are Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, and Douglas
Ginsburg. Id. at 26, 31, 54.
2. See id. at 26.
3. Black's Law Dictionary does not contain a definition for "textualism," instead
cross-referencing textualism with "strict constructionism." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 5
(8th ed. 2004). Textualism is a doctrinal rule of judicial construction requiring judges to
interpret a document or statute according to its plain, objective meaning. Textualism and
originalism are often used interchangeably. They are similar interpretative
methodologies; originalism is, in effect, textualism applied to constitutional
interpretation. If there is a difference, originalists tend to look more closely at drafters'
1
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especially notable in the Protestant fundamentalist context-which is
anchored in scriptural literalism.
The relationship appears to have been first sketched by Professor
Morton J. Horwitz in his 1989 essay, The Meaning of the Bork
Nomination in American Constitutional History.4 Horwitz writes, "To
the extent that Constitution worship is America's secular religion, and all
religions have a tendency toward fundamentalism, originalism in
constitutional discourse is the equivalent of religious fundamentalism." 5
After positing this textual equivalence, Horwitz extended his analysis,
suggesting that constitutional originalists and religious fundamentalists
also share an opposition to modem interpretative theories.6 However,
Horwitz hemmed the thread between the two schools of interpretation.
Other legal commentators have pursued this analysis, 7 stressing
especially the link between the two because of their fidelity to, and the
authority of, foundational written texts in their respective traditions.
However, the parallels they draw between the schools of thought are
narrow. In fact, commentators disclaim that originalism bears any
substantive connection to religious fundamentalism. 8 Narrowly focusing
on the analogy between originalism and fundamentalism and their
respective views toward text reveals a fruitful connection, but it obscures
a broader, deeper relationship between the two. This deeper relationship
lies less in the approach to textual interpretation than in the ambition of
the message and the attitude of the messenger.
This paper focuses on Justice Antonin Scalia and the extent to
which his judicial persona may appropriately be called
"fundamentalist." 9 I contend that textualism and originalism are not the
intentions than textualists, who look solely to the meaning of the text. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Textualism and Democratic Legitimacy: Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119, 1120 n.4 (1998).
4. 50 U. PITt. L. REv. 655 (1989).
5. Id. at 663.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297, 1309-10 (1990) [hereinafter Kannar, Constitutional Catechism].
8. See SUNSTErN, supra note 1, at 5.
9. I am well aware that the term "fundamentalism" has almost uniformly pejorative
connotations in the wider culture. I am also nearly certain that Justice Scalia would recoil
at the claim that he has a "fundamentalist" legal persona. As a student of contemporary
religion, however, I am interested in fundamentalism as a uniquely potent cross-cultural
phenomenon of the twentieth century. Where other commentators may use it as a slur (or
in the case of fundamentalists themselves, as a shield), I use it as a descriptive. My
objective in this paper is not to engage in polemics, not to bash or praise, but rather to
examine the religious fundamentalist's outlook in an effort to place Justice Scalia's
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constituent parts of his fundamentalism. Rather, Justice Scalia's judicial
persona resembles that of a fundamentalist because of his attitude toward
contemporary culture and his colleagues, his approach toward legal
interpretation, and his ambition for the widescale penetration of his
distinctive perspective. Scalia's judicial persona may also be considered
"fundamentalist," because of the depth of antagonism and anxiety his
views engender in his adversaries.
Justice Scalia's approach to constitutional and statutory
interpretation (again, as shorthand, "textualist" for statutory
interpretation and "originalist" for constitutional interpretation) stresses
fidelity to the plain meaning of a "dead," or unchanging, text. In
speeches, Justice Scalia routinely observes that this method was once
"constitutional orthodoxy" in the United States.'0 Yet Scalia's judicial
persona consists of more than his text-centered interpretative approach.
Indeed, he is an outspoken and often confrontational justice, a lightning
rod who is at once admired and reviled for his opposition to "modem"
forms of interpretation; his fealty to text and tradition; his attacks on
extratextual sources for interpretation (for example, legislative history);
his distinctive public advocacy of his jurisprudential point of view; his
derision of legal culture's prevailing norms; and the embattled, isolated
tone that permeates many of his opinions. Justice Scalia has attracted
both fierce detractors and staunch defenders. Observers have branded
his style as "radical,"' 1 "counter-revolutionary," ' 12  "martial,"' 3
"promot[ing] an alternative faith about the function of Constitution and
law in the American polity,' 4 and "deploy[ing] a rhetoric that exposes
judicial persona within a broader cultural perspective. Moreover, this paper does not
question Justice Scalia's claim that he is an originalist-and an adherent to what he
considers legal orthodoxy. Instead, it raises the question whether the stylistic
characteristics of religious fundamentalism reveal something new about Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence and its impact on American legal culture.
10. See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at The Catholic University of
America: A Theory of Constitution Interpretation, (Oct. 18, 1996), available at
http://www.courttv.com/archive/legaldocs/rights/scalia.html) [hereinafter Scalia,
Remarks]; Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40.
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624
(1990).
12. David B. Anders, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute
Between Justice 0 'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 924 (1993).
13. See Talbot, supra note 10, at 54.
14. RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE
REVIVAL 1 (1997).
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the essential fraudulence of the Court's claim to be interpreting the
Constitution."'
' 5
A number of observers brand Scalia a fundamentalist because of his
commitment to statutory textualism and constitutional originalism. Yet
Justice Scalia concedes that periodically, he is a "faint-hearted
originalist.' 16 He admits that textualism, taken to its extreme, has "a lot
of problems."' 7 He calls strict constructionism-the exclusively literal
reading of legal text-a "degraded form of textualism that brings the
whole philosophy into disrepute."' 8  Furthermore, his public speeches
and essays on his interpretative method suggest that textualism and
originalism represent for him pragmatic choices as much as ideological
necessities. 9 Scalia is not a textual absolutist.
Rather than cataloguing his textualism or originalism, this paper
represents an exploration of how Justice Scalia engages legal text and the
legal establishment, how he articulates his understanding of America and
its traditions, and how he effectuates his aspiration for significant legal
change in the United States. In its conclusion, this paper suggests that
Justice Scalia's fundamentalist judicial persona has contributed to the
politicization of the federal judiciary. Given Justice Scalia's impact, one
may expect to see more nominees who fuse combative judicial rhetoric,
what might be called interpretative obedience, and a restorative agenda
in the federal judiciary. This may lead to progressively more heated and
confrontational confirmation battles.
II. Defining Fundamentalism
Religious fundamentalism is, by definition, a modem phenomenon,
as well as a response to modem phenomena. At its inception,
fundamentalism was a distinctively Protestant American movement.2°
15. Ramesh Ponnuru, Demystifying the Court: What Justice Scalia Is Up To, NAT'L
REv. ONLINE, July 1, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru
070103.asp.
16. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CON. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism].
17. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 6.
18. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 23 (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION].
19. Kannar, Constitutional Catechism, supra note 7, at 1345.
20. The term "fundamentalism" was first introduced between 1910 and 1915 when
a pair of brothers who had gained great wealth in a California oil boom sponsored the
composition and circulation of a pamphlet entitled "The Fundamentals: A Testimony of
Truth." MALISE RUTHVEN, FUNDAMENTALISM: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING 10 (2004).
[Vol. 26:445
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From the outset, what came to be known as fundamentalism represented
a religious-political response to seismic social change. Protestant
fundamentalists positioned themselves as defenders of a formerly
uncorrupted culture overrun by a new intellectual and social elite.2 As
crusaders for moral purity, Protestant Fundamentalists mounted a radical
backlash against a society that appeared increasingly dismissive of
tradition.22 Over the course of the twentieth century, fundamentalisms
emerged in other religious traditions: Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and
Sikhism, among others.
While each community's "fundamentals" vary,23 fundamentalisms
share certain essential characteristics.24 These essential characteristics,
described as "family resemblances, ' 25 reflect "patterns of activism
26
emerging at a particular time in world history.27 These "family
resemblances" allow the distinct movements to be "fruitfully
compared.
28
The brothers helped fund the mailing of three million of these pamphlets to Protestant
pastors, missionaries, theology students and professors, as well as YMCA secretaries,
church school directors, and editors of religious publications, with the professed aim of
halting the erosion of what the brothers considered to be the "fundamental" beliefs of
Protestantism. Id. at 10-11. In 1920, the term was also notably used by a theologically
conservative Protestant editor who said he, along with other militant and devoted
believers, was willing to do "battle royal" to preserve the "fundamentals" of the Christian
faith, then under a seemingly withering onslaught by evolutionists and biblical critics.
GABRIEL A. ALMOND, R. SCOTT APPLEBY & EMMANUEL SWAN, STRONG RELIGION: THE
RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD 1-2 ( 20 03 ). Among these
"fundamental" beliefs was the inerrancy of the Bible. RUTHVEN, supra, at 10-11.
21. Robert A. Garson, Political Fundamentalism and Popular Democracy in the
1920's, in MODERN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND ITS WORLD 129, 143 (1993).
22. Id.
23. Indeed, there is great diversity within any one religious tradition's
fundamentalist believers, as well.
24. A number of scholars and practitioners charge that the term "fundamentalism"
has become too politically charged and over-used, especially by those on the religious
and political left, to describe accurately any particular phenomenon. They assert that
"fundamentalism" is a term of abuse-a synonym for political extremism and religious
fanaticism, often accompanied by violence-that loses its meaning as it refers to
increasingly more groups. See RUTHVEN, supra note 20, at 6-7. However, many other
prominent scholars of fundamentalism believe that a comparison of fundamentalisms is
appropriate and potentially illuminating. See, e.g., BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, DEFENDERS OF
GOD: THE FUNDAMENTALIST REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN AGE (1989); ALMOND ET
AL., supra note 20; Fundamentalism, http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu
/nrms/fund.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
25. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 6.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 6, 35-36 (Because each community shapes its worldview in a tradition-
5
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The first, and perhaps most elemental, fundamentalist "family
resemblance" is a reactive, confrontational worldview. Fundamentalist
movements are militant, mobilized, self-conscious responses to
modernity. 29 To the fundamentalist, modernity represents a world
unmoored from traditional values and antagonistic to immutable truths.3"
Fundamentalists believe the modem worldview is contaminated by its
secular permissiveness; 3' by its elevation of the individual above the
community and God;32 and by its corrosive rationality, which challenges
longstanding value systems and authority.33 They target as their primary
adversaries not only the elites of secular culture, but also those members
of their own faith traditions whom they believe have grown
impermissibly rationalistic and relativistic.34 For example, haredi (or
ultra-orthodox) Jews view the more liberal Jewish denominations
(Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist) as heretical non-Jewish
movements that seek to assimilate and, inevitably, to "destroy
Judaism., 35 Thus, fundamentalist movements begin in an "anti"-stance:
where prevailing cultural mores are permissive, fundamentalists stress
restrictiveness; where prevailing religious teachings permit relativism,
fundamentalists preach absolutes; and where politics privileges
compromise, fundamentalists reject it.36
A second closely related "family resemblance" is the
fundamentalist's defiance. As part of their confrontational worldview,
fundamentalists take concededly "scandalous" positions in an effort to
shock, unsettle, and affront outsiders.37 Fundamentalists reject the
prevailing norms of contemporary culture, anchoring this rejection as an
expression of their belief in an unchanging faith. The impulse to
scandalize emerges from a conviction that there exists a way to imagine
and understand the world other than the modem, rational, secular
specific way, establishing functional parallels rather than "exact equivalents" is the goal).
29. Id. at 99.
30. See MARTIN E. MARTY & R. ScoTr APPLEBY, THE GLORY AND THE POWER: THE
FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE TO THE MODERN WORLD 15 (1992).
31. RUTHVEN, supra note 20, at 23.
32. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 33.
33. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 96.
34. See VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN AMERICA FROM
THE PULPIT TO THE BENCH 44-45 (2000).
35. Answers.com, Relationships Between Jewish Religious Movements,
http://www.answers.com/topic/relationships-between-jewish-religious-movements (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006).
36. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 182-83.
37. Id. at 23.
450 [Vol. 26:445
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outlook.38  Fundamentalists accept that the mainstream views them as
marginalized. 39 Far from accommodating to gain acceptance by the
mainstream, fundamentalists relish their place at the margins and
perceive themselves as "under siege ... even persecuted., 40 Thus, when
fundamentalists are cast by the mainstream media as out of touch with
modem thought they often acquiesce in these portrayals to bolster their
marginalized self-image.41 Aware of their marginalization, conscious of
their defensiveness, and defiantly proud of the traditionalism that sets
them squarely against the secular mainstream, fundamentalists assume
these stances to reject explicitly a modem world that fails to live up to
their exacting standards.42
A third "family resemblance" is the restorative or revivalist quality
of fundamentalist movements. Fundamentalists seek not merely to
critique the world as is, but to change it, ushering the restoration of
traditional values into contemporary culture.4 3 They aspire to convert
others to their worldview, 44 and to create a "contrary world," both as a
bequest to future generations and as an assault on the current status
quo.45 A crucial part of this restorative project is to regain interpretative
authority over their sacred texts and traditions. For example, in the
1920s Protestant fundamentalists recoiled at the biblical Higher Criticism
then dominant in European and liberal American seminaries. Originating
in Germany in the late nineteenth century, the Higher Criticism
movement sought to determine through scholarship the authenticity and
authorship of the Bible.46 The movement "began to challenge the
received understandings of the Bible, for example by using sophisticated
models of textual analysis to argue that books attributed to Moses or
Isaiah show evidence of editorial changes, textual accumulations, and
38. Id. at 24.
39. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 35.
40. Id.
41. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 14 (Protestant Fundamentalists as
"Cultural Neanderthals"), 95-98 (haredi Jews as late medieval anachronisms).
42. However, it is crucial to note that fundamentalists are not separatists; they
frequently live and work alongside those who believe differently. And though
traditionalist, fundamentalists are nevertheless at home in the modem, technologically
advanced world, making use of modem media to spread their distinct messages and build
their respective movements. Id. at 183.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id. at 17.
45. Id. at 19.
46. CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 38.
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multiple authorship .... 47 Protestant fundamentalists responded by
formulating the inerrancy of scripture as an article of faith.
Fundamentalist pastors and teachers believed the Bible was true;
inerrancy thereby served to retrieve the purity and orthodoxy of an
earlier time. 48  A vital part of fundamentalist movements' self-
understanding lies in their claim that their repudiation of the present
serves to hasten the restoration of the past, whether the past is embodied
by a privileged text, tradition, or teacher.49  Their innovations are
understood (or, viewed differently, are framed) as retrievals, and they
buttress the audacity of their claims with the authority of ancient, or
foundational, precedent.
A fourth "family resemblance" of fundamentalist movements is
expressed in their professed obedience to a sacred text, an immemorial
tradition, or the authoritative teachings of a recognized leader. For
fundamentalists, obedience serves a way to validate their claims of
authenticity. To return to the example of Protestant fundamentalists'
belief in the inerrancy of scripture: inerrancy functions as a proxy for
obedience. For Protestant fundamentalists, submission to the Bible's
plain meaning becomes the most authentic way to honor the scriptures. 50
Any deviation from the scriptural text undermines its timeless, indeed
self-evident, authority. 51 Obedience to text not only demonstrates the
fundamentalists' fidelity to its presumed Creator, but also spotlights the
"naturalness" and neutrality of the fundamentalists' mode of
interpretation.52 By contrast, other interpretative methods appear to be
human inventions or manipulations.
A fifth "family resemblance" is the movements' shared aspiration
for purity and absolutes. Fundamentalists choose to see themselves as a
47. RUTHVEN, supra note 20, at 17.
48. Nancy T. Ammerman, Re-awakening a Sleeping Giant: Christian
Fundamentalists in Late Twentieth-Century U.S. Society, in THE FREEDOM TO Do GOD'S
WILL: RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 89, 96 (Gerrie ter Haar &
James J. Busuttil eds., 2003). Note that in the Protestant fundamentalist context,
inerrancy typically denotes literalism. However, many people of faith view their
scripture as "inerrant," yet do not equate inerrancy with literalism. Rather, in this
context, inerrancy connotes an understanding that the scripture was divinely revealed. If
these believers believe that the text is the product of human authorship, these human
authors were divinely inspired. By contrast, religious fundamentalists approach text as
divinely revealed and thus absolutely, literally true.
49. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 92.
50. CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 261.
51. See id. at 219.
52. See generally id. at 16-17.
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"righteous remnant turned vanguard," a pure minority enclave fighting
against a corrupt, dominant, intrusive majority.53 Their quest for purity
is articulated in a number of ways. First, fundamentalist communities
impose rigid rules to constrain the seemingly limitless choices in modem
secular culture. This includes prioritizing a legalism that promises
certainty and security through a punctilious observance of sacred law
and/or custom.5 4  For example, the belief in scripture's inerrancy
promotes the adoption of "unambiguous behavioral rules. 55  Second,
fundamentalist movements maintain rigid boundaries between their
communities and the world outside. They draw stark lines to divide
them from their enemies 56 as well as lines to establish clear, stratified
divisions within their own communities between men and women and
adults and children.57 These boundaries are erected to prevent the
penetration of secular, relativistic viewpoints into their communities and,
more specifically, their interpretative frameworks. 8  Third,
fundamentalists interpret texts and traditions to clarify and reify the
absolutes by which their communities must abide. 59  By promoting
absolutes in the effort for interpretative purity, fundamentalist
communities try to eliminate "potentially dangerous plays with language
and meaning.
' 60
These aforementioned "family resemblances"-confrontational
worldview, defiant attitude, revivalist ambition, obedience to text and
tradition, and commitment to purity-point to a sixth and, for the
purposes of this paper, final "family resemblance" of fundamentalist
movements: their inescapably political, transformational nature.
Fundamentalisms, while rooted in theology and religious observance, are
simultaneously political movements operating at a number of different
levels. First, ideological: fundamentalisms aim to change the way people
think about current social norms and accepted practices and to help
people imagine another way to organize the world.6' Second,
53. LAWRENCE, supra note 24, at 100.
54. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 232.
55. See id. at 102.
56. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 29.
57. Grant Wacker, The Rise of Fundamentalism, http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us:8080
(follow "TeacherServe" hyperlink; then follow "20th Century" hyperlink; then follow
"The Rise of Fundamentalism") (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
58. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 93, 96.
59. See id. at 96.
60. CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 16.
61. Ammerman, supra note 48, at 93-94.
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interpretative: a large swath of the fundamentalist battlefield consists of a
fight for authority over how to understand history and text.62 The
fundamentalist claims of fidelity to text and tradition are, at least in part,
strategies to harness history to their side. Their rhetorical deference to
tradition stands in stark contrast to a changing, modernizing culture.63
Third, organizational: fundamentalisms are "community-building
movements in a time of modern individualist anomie on many cultural
scenes." 64  The political potency of Protestant fundamentalism, for
example, is the product of decades of community organizing, savvy use
of media, the founding of independent schools and seminaries, and the
regular convening of conferences. 65  Furthermore, fundamentalist
movements place special emphasis on recruiting and mobilizing young
people into political organizations and militant cadres.66  Fourth,
rhetorical: as they point to tradition as the path of the future,
fundamentalist movements simultaneously cast elites as hegemonic
defenders of the status quo. Fundamentalists thereby project themselves
as "world transformers', 67 and communicate their aspirations with
"charismatic intensity. 68
Interestingly, this political nature of fundamentalist movements
tends to alter the believers over time. 69 By participating in a political
culture that invites compromise, fundamentalists gain access to power.7°
In securing this political foothold, fundamentalists sacrifice a degree of
authenticity about their place at the margins.71 Thus, their ideological
and rhetorical stances serve, at least in part, to shield fundamentalists
from claims that they have capitulated to the mainstream. By
62. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 53.
63. Ammerman, supra note 48, at 96.
64. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 33.
65. Joel A. Carpenter, Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical
Protestantism, 1924-1942, in 10 MODERN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND ITS WORLD 55,
60-63 (1993). However, as Samuel Bray noted in earlier comments, Protestant
fundamentalism has a strong escapist, millennial component. Many fundamentalists
believe that politics, like the current world, is irretrievably corrupt, and admonish their
co-religionists to remain apart from this-worldly political aims because the world can be
transformed solely through Christ's return.
66. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 92.
67. FUNDAMENTALISMS COMPREHENDED 478-79 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., 1995).
68. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 34.
69. ALMOND ET AL., supra note 20, at 12.
70. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 30, at 180.
71. Id.
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announcing that they remain resolutely apart, even when entrenched in
the establishment they rail against, fundamentalists are able to wield
power at the same time they profess to resist it.
III. Does Justice Scalia Have a Fundamentalist Judicial Persona?
[Justice Scalia] believes he has the true faith, the real understanding of the
Constitution, and that others who basically agree with him don't have the
guts to follow through. He runs the risk of alienating the others, of crying
in the wilderness. But he may be creating a climate in which his way of
thinking is intellectually acceptable, even compelling.
72
To characterize Justice Scalia's distinctive brand of
fundamentalism, I use three phrases to describe him: confrontational
defender, faithful servant, and world transformer.7 3 Each of these
phrases is distinct because each addresses a different aspect of Justice
Scalia's judicial persona. "Confrontational defender" refers to Justice
Scalia's relationship with those individuals and institutions he casts as
his ideological bytes noires, whether they are Supreme Court colleagues,
litigants, legal and social elites, or cultural currents more generally.
"Faithful servant" refers to Justice Scalia's judicial approach and his
relationship with sources, whether they are constitutional or statutory text
or legal tradition. Finally, "world transformer" refers to Justice Scalia's
ambition, his self-understanding, and what can be effectively described
as his aspirational impact on the legal world.
It should be noted that these attributes do not encapsulate Justice
Scalia's jurisprudential approach. Indeed, in some facets of his
jurisprudence, the fundamentalist analogy fails. 74  Nevertheless, these
72. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Dissenters: Loners or Pioneers?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1990, at B7 (quoting Geoffrey Stone).
73. I hope these phrases effectively encapsulate the "family resemblances" explored
above. As with the above "family resemblances," there will surely be overlap among
these categories. What makes the judicial fundamentalist is the aggregation of these
different attributes. One could identify many judges who prominently display one or
even two of these traits. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas might be considered a
confrontational defender. Former Chief Justice Earl Warren might be regarded as a
world transformer. Justice Hugo Black would be acknowledged for his interpretative
obedience. The judge with the fundamentalist persona, however, is distinctive and
unusual because he (or she) combines all of these attitudinal attributes. Perhaps only
Judge Robert H. Bork could also be appropriately called a judicial fundamentalist within
this analysis.
74. For example, like a religious fundamentalist, Justice Scalia may routinely view
academic and social elites with scorn, but unlike many religious fundamentalists, he is
not at all anti-intellectual. Indeed, many observers believe he is the most intellectually
11
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different characteristics, when viewed together, make Justice Scalia a
legal figure with a distinctively fundamentalist outlook and agenda.
A. Confrontational Defender
This section examines the ways in which Justice Scalia functions as
a "confrontational defender" and focuses in particular on five sub-areas:
1) his self-identification as a "maligned minority" defending long-
established legal orthodoxies and moral norms; 2) his pointed critique on
the prevailing ethos of law school "elites"; 3) his steady-some might
say, relentless-attacks on the relativism of modem legal theory and the
undemocratic nature of judicial activism; 4) his combative, charismatic
rhetorical style; and 5) his biting, often scathingly delivered opinions on
hot-button political issues (religion, homosexuality, and abortion),
modem mores, and what he views as his colleagues' submission to them.
1. Maligned Minority
Despite his position as a life-tenured justice on the nation's highest
court-and a legal career that includes a degree from Harvard Law
School, a three-year stint as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of
Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, time spent teaching at four
of the nation's most highly regarded law schools, as well as four years of
service on the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia-Justice
Scalia regularly portrays himself as an outsider, marginalized because of
his interpretative preferences and his moral positions. In language that
seems to fuse pride and concession, Scalia frequently acknowledges that,
as a self-professed textualist and originalist, he is a member of a "small
but hardy school" which once represented "constitutional orthodoxy.,
75
In his Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton University in March,
1995, Justice Scalia said his commitment to textualism and originalism is
astute of the Court's current justices. Like religious fundamentalists, Justice Scalia
believes wholeheartedly in the rightness of his interpretative approach and social vision;
yet unlike them, he is not prepared to impose that approach and this vision on his
adversaries. Thus, while Justice Scalia may believe abortion is wrong as a moral matter
and that a constitutional right to abortion offends the text of the Constitution, he
advocates only that the right to abortion be decided state-by-state. A religious
fundamentalist, by contrast, would seek an absolute ban. In addition, Justice Scalia,
recognizes that the texts and traditions he obeys are products of a specific historical
circumstance, whereas religious fundamentalists are far more likely to assume an
ahistorical approach to their sources.
75. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 1.
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"repugnant to the first instincts of much of the legal profession."7 6 Later
in the same speech he added that some in "sophisticated circles" regard
his textualism as "simple-minded." 77  At a recent speech at the
University of Michigan Law School, Justice Scalia recounted a
conversation he has routinely: "People ask me, 'When did you first
become an originalist?,' like they're saying, 'When did you first start
eating human flesh?', 78  His approach, at once seemingly self-
deprecating and facetious, allows Scalia to represent himself as part of a
dwindling, beleaguered group that looks aberrant to the conventional
majority.79 Yale law professor Robert Burt stated that "[Scalia] has this
view of himself as embattled... always fighting the desperate fight.,
80
Scalia extends his marginalized self-perception to his faith
background, as well. For example, at a 1996 Mississippi prayer
breakfast, Scalia told the attendees that "We are fools for Christ's sake
... We must pray for the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated
world," adding that in educated circles Christians are often regarded as
"simpleminded., 81 A devout, traditionally-minded Catholic, Scalia has
accused some colleagues on the Court, and by extension the broader
American culture, of effusing "a positive hostility to religion., 82 The
Court, he has written, likens religion to "some purely personal avocation
that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of
one's room."83 His colleagues, one concludes from the language he uses,
are not just neutral toward religion; rather, they display active animosity
toward it. In his view, they frequently depict religion-in Scalia's mind
a necessary moral anchor in this morally topsy-turvy age-as an offender
of reasonable people's sensibilities. For Scalia, religious conviction, like
76. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 79.
77. See id. at 97-98.
78. Talbot, supra note 10, at 42.
79. James S. Kunen, One Angry Man: Even on a Conservative Court, Antonin
Scalia Manages to Seem Embattled, TIME, July 8, 1996, at 48.
80. Id. at 49.
81. Id. In this speech, Justice Scalia was citing Corinthians, in which Paul writes:
"For it seems to me that God has put us apostles on display at the end of the procession,
like men condemned to die in the arena. We have been made a spectacle to the whole
universe, to angels as well as to men. We are fools for Christ, but you are so wise in
Christ!" 1 Corinthians 4:9-10. To some extent, a "simpleminded" self-conception may be
a component of a Christian's understanding in any age. There is a measure of wisdom,
and honor, and salvation in one's public (self-)deprecation.
82. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 749 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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textualism, stands as a bulwark against the relativism and nihilism of the
"vulgar age" in which we live.8 4 Yet, these beliefs--orthodox as they
may have been generations ago-today invite the "scorn of the
sophisticated."
2. Elites
"Law-trained elites" comprise one of Justice Scalia's most frequent
targets. "Law-trained elites" are those sophisticated individuals and
groups who, in Justice Scalia's mind, privilege their own views over the
democratic process, churning the rule of law into the rule of men.
85
Scalia attacks those in the legal profession-academics, judges, and
lawyers-whose commitment to the "Living Constitution" not only
subverts the proper functioning of the democratic process, but threatens
the viability of the Constitution itself.86 In particular, judges, plucked
largely from the academic and cultural elite, are ill-equipped at
determining divisive political and social questions.8 7  Instead, they
frequently substitute their values for those expressed by democratic
majorities.8
Moreover, academic elites have concocted interpretative theories
which call into question the plain meaning of textual language (e.g.,
Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Legal Studies).
Justice Scalia's derision of this interpretative relativism recalls the deep
suspicion with which fundamentalists viewed the Higher Criticism
biblical scholars in the 1920s. Much of the potency of this critique, of
course, lies in the fact that, in Scalia's view, "law-trained elites" seek to
shape the Constitution to meet their own objectives, whereas Scalia seeks
only to protect the Constitution. In this respect, he recognizes his agenda
as including the safeguarding of constitutionally guaranteed rights from
culture warriors who seek to impose their own elite, minority views on
the nation's majority. That this places him on the frontline of the culture
wars, Justice Scalia concedes, willingly.
84. Id. at 637.
85. Allen R. Kamp, The Counter-Revolutionary Nature of Justice Scalia's
"Traditionalism ", 27 PAC. L.J. 99, 113-14 (1995); David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and
His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48
EMORY L.J. 1377, 1386 (1999).
86. Zlotnick, supra note 85, at 1385.
87. See id. at 1386.
88. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:445
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/3
2006] JUDICIAL PERSONA OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 459
3. Modem Legal Relativism
Justice Scalia believes there is a "Great Divide" in current
constitutional interpretation between original meaning and current
meaning.89 Originalism, once orthodoxy, today seems an interpretative
anachronism, a state Scalia deplores even while he appears to relish his
advocacy of an orthodoxy dismissed by the mainstream. He places his
own beliefs in relief against what he describes as "the ascendant school
of constitutional interpretation," one which "affirms the existence of
what is called 'the Living Constitution,' a body of law that (unlike
normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the
needs of a changing society." 90  Under this interpretative approach,
judges delegate to themselves the authority to determine the needs of a
society in flux.91 In the process, judges' views replace those of the
people's elected representatives and, according to Scalia, American
society grows progressively less democratic.
Justice Scalia employs another name for advocates of the "Living
Constitution" model: "nonoriginalists." Nonoriginalism enables the
Constitution to change based on the predilections of unelected judges and
the currents of prevailing public opinion. Nonoriginalism, which under
one or another formulation invokes
"fundamental values" as the touchstone of constitutionality... [makes it]
very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political
values that he personally thinks most important, and those political values
that are "fundamental to our society." Thus, by the adoption of such a
criterion judicial personalization of the law is enormously facilitated.92
The drastic tilt toward nonoriginalism has taken place within the
past forty years, and conservatives as well as liberals are equally prone to
fashion new rights under this "evolutionist" theory of the Constitution.
93
But the "Great Divide," to continue to use Scalia's term, is "not a liberal
89. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 38.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863.
93. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 4 (equating, in this respect, the federal
constitutional right to abortion advocated by liberals with the federal constitutional right
not to have an excessive jury verdict advocated by conservatives). Scalia's use of
"evolutionist" to deride his rivals is also worth mention, given that many observers
suggest that the fundamentalist community's entrance into mainstream American
consciousness occurred during the 1925 Scopes Monkey Trial, in which a Tennessee
teacher was convicted for teaching evolution when a state statute barred it.
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versus conservative issue."94 Rather, it pits the "modernist versus the
traditionalist view of the Constitution." 95  Scalia frames this
interpretative battle in precisely the same language that religious
fundamentalists use to frame theirs. For nonoriginalists, the Constitution
is a document in which the meaning may change as American society
changes. To Scalia, this is unacceptable. During the time when
originalism was constitutional orthodoxy,
everyone at least said ... that the Constitution was that anchor, that rock,
that unchanging institution that forms the American polity. Immutability
was regarded as its characteristic. What it meant when it was adopted it
means today, and its meaning doesn't change just because we think that
meaning is no longer adequate to our times.
9
There is in Scalia's rhetoric, then, the sense that the modernist
nonoriginalists are in some way upsetting the very balance of the
American cosmos. Scalia does not back away from this claim.
"Nonoriginalism," he has said, is "the death knell of the Constitution
[sic]." 97  To believe in an "evolving" Constitution is tantamount to
chiseling away at the bedrock of the American polity, because judges
will become the nation's political decision-makers, and the constitutional
protections guaranteed by the ratifiers will be, or can be, brushed aside.
Only "originalism" represents a faithful interpretative methodology.98 A
"traditionalist" understanding appears to be all that stands between the
American polity and the chaos born of relativism and a belief in an
evolving Constitution.
4. Combative Rhetoric and Charismatic Leadership
Religious fundamentalist leadership relies heavily on the power of
personality, on rhetorical skills, and on a combative nature. The same is
true for Justice Scalia, whose judicial personality and public persona
spotlight his charisma, self-assuredness, and ideological ferocity. Take,
for example, a 1996 speech at Catholic University in Washington, D.C.,
during which Scalia expressed unusually concessionary language about
originalism:
Originalism has a lot of problems. It's not always easy to do. Sometimes
94. Id. at 4.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 7-8.
98. Zlotnick, supra note 85, at 1378.
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it's very hard. Sometimes it's awful hard to tell what the original meaning
was .... But the real problem is not whether it's the best thing in the
world, but whether there's anything better... And the fact is, I have never
heard another one that has a snowball's chance in hell of ever being
adopted by more than two people .... If you don't take what I suggest,
what is the standard? The answer is, there isn't any.99
Scalia dismisses the possibility that any other effective interpretative
methodology exists other than his own. It is an inflexibility born of self-
certainty. Moreover, the audience listening to Scalia is led to respond: if
Justice Scalia has not heard of a plausible or potential alternative, there
really must be none. Often in his opinions, as here, Justice Scalia aims to
put forth not merely a convincing argument, but an irrebuttable one. 00
In addition, his language--"snowball's chance in hell"-is colorful and
colloquial, yet combative.
Scalia's opinions are marked by a feistiness and antagonism quite
possibly unmatched in Supreme Court history.10' In opinions, he has
maligned his colleagues on the Court for fashioning a constitutional
jurisprudence that is "nothing short of preposterous,"' 102 for writing
opinions that are "oblivious to our history,"'' 0 3 for writing an opinion that
"vandaliz[es]... our people's tradition,"' 4 for "inventing" rather than
"interpreting" a constitution in a manner that is "nothing less than
Orwellian,"'0 5 and for imposing their own "self-righteous" social and
economic perspectives on an unwitting nation.' 0 6 Partly because of this
often mocking, incendiary tone, he has gained a great many detractors,
who criticize him with their own powerful language. 10 7  What is
99. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 7.
100. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's "self-awarded sovereignty" over the field of
abortion regulation is assuredly not a role for the Court); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (using a dictionary to "prove" that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees "always and everywhere" a criminal defendant the right
to face-to-face meetings with witnesses at trial).
101. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical
Appraisal, 22 U. FlAw. L. REV. 385, 399 (2000).
102. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996).
103. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633 (1992).
104. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
105. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
990, 995 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
106. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Commentators have described Justice Scalia's style as "abrasive," see, e.g.,
Kunen, supra note 79 (quoting Professor Mark Tushnet); evincing a "siege mentality,"
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fundamentalist about Justice Scalia in these exchanges is that the
scandalizing language he employs in opinions and public speeches is met
(at least by commentators, if not by his judicial colleagues) with the kind
of derision typically reserved for vilified political leaders but seldom
extended toward judges.
Scalia unloads much of his rhetorical artillery in his frequent
dissents. 0 8 Scalia has written: "Dissents are simply the normal course of
things. Indeed, if one's opinions were never dissented from, he would
begin to suspect that his colleagues considered him insipid, or simply not
worthy of contradiction."' 0 9 Expressing a sense of home in the minority,
Scalia's singular voice and perspective acquire a higher volume in
dissent. Furthermore, he often targets for attack not merely the opinions
of the Court as a whole, but specific justices, especially those like
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor, who Scalia often
deems to be traitors to the cause of interpretative integrity.' 10
Due in part to his contrarian persona and his ideological self-
confidence, Scalia has developed an enthusiastic, loyal following. For
instance, in his public appearances following the Court's ruling in
Lawrence v. Texas,"' which struck down a Texas law prohibiting
sodomy, Scalia reportedly "mocked" ' 12 Justice Kennedy's majority
see id.; "militant," Zlotnick, supra note 85, at 1427; "remarkably myopic. .. very much
like the jurisprudence that comes out of the literalist Islamic school," Douglas McCollam,
Annotating Islam, THE AM. LAW. MAG. (Dec. 2001), available at http://
www.scholarofthehouse.org/anamlawmagde.html. They have said Scalia is "more
Jeremiah than judge," Dahlia Lithwick, Scaliapalooza, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2003,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2090532; that he resides in an "anachronistic moral and social
universe," George Kannar, Strenuous Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision of
Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1845, 1865 (1991); and that having "accepted a
commission in the... Kulturkampf... his loyal foot soldiers are now heeding his call,"
Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 28.
108. Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissents are noteworthy enough that an anthology of
them was recently edited by a lawyer and fan of Scalia's. See generally KEvIN A. RING,
SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN
JUSTICE (2004).
109. Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand; The High Court and
the Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 4.
110. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532, 537 (claiming
in dissent that Justice O'Connor's views could not be "taken seriously," and that
"irrational is the new concept that Justice O'Connor introduces into the law"); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion "la[ys] waste.. .our rational-basis jurisprudence").
111. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. Peter Augustine Lawler, Supreme Mocking, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Oct. 27,
2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/lawler200310270839.asp.
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opinion before "adoring" crowds. 1 3  Scalia recounts another incident
when, during the 2004 presidential campaign, he accidentally received a
fundraising appeal from Democratic strategist James Carville.1
4
Carville sought funds with this "terrifying" message on the flier: "What
Would You Think of Chief Justice Scalia?" 115 When Scalia recounted
the anecdote at a Federalist Society meeting in fall, 2004, "the audience
erupted into sustained and thunderous cheers and applause."' 16  The
article stated that Scalia enjoys an "exalted status among a growing cadre
of conservative law students, lawyers, professors, and judges. 1 7 They
see him as an intrepid legal warrior seeking to put rules back into the rule
of law."' 8 In an earlier political season, John McGinnis, professor at
Cardozo School of Law, suggested in a National Review article that
Scalia would be "the model candidate" for a 2000 presidential run.
119
Several websites-including The Scalia Shrine120 and Cult of Scalia 12 1-
are dedicated to praising Justice Scalia. One commentator asks what has
driven "Justice Scalia to eschew the reclusive public life of many
justices, or at least the blandly apolitical public lives of most, to play the
role of benighted public intellectual and knight gallant in the culture
wars?" 1 22 At times as much passionate advocate as nonpartisan jurist,
Scalia has gained a following, at least in part, by courting a following.
5. Defending Traditional Moral Values
Justice Scalia also bears a striking resemblance to religious
fundamentalists in the manner in which he defends traditional moral
values 123 on some of the hot-button cultural issues that come before the
113. Lithwick, supra note 107.
114. Warren Richey, One Justice's Vision of Role of the Courts, CHRISTIAN SCi.
MONITOR, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1116/p01s03-usju.html.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Glen Elsasser, No Contest: Top Court's Top Fighter is Scalia, CHI. TRIB., May
27, 1997, at 1.
120. See http://www.johnh.wheaton.edu/-johnmitch/scalia.html. (no longer
available).
121. See Cult of Scalia, http://members.aol.com/schwenkler/scalia/ (last visited
Mar. 16, 2006).
122. Lithwick, supra note 107.
123. It should be noted that occasionally, what Justice Scalia disdains in these
opinions is not the underlying behavior, but the legal elite's willingness to undermine
conventional morals legislation that accord with long-standing American traditions. See,
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Court. 12 4  This section will look briefly at two areas of the Court's
jurisprudence: religion and abortion. 125
Commentators note that at a substantive legal level, Justice Scalia
tends to enforce both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in a
"weak" manner; that is, he is strongly disinclined to endorse judicially-
mandated free exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws or to
strike down laws as effecting an establishment of religion. 26 Justice
Scalia subscribes to the majoritarian belief that demarcation of the
boundary between church and state should be left to the elected
legislature rather than the unelected judiciary.12 7  However, also
strikingly constant in Scalia's religion clause opinions are his dissents,
which routinely accuse the majority of an anti-religious animosity that
undermines the place of faith in American history, and supplants the
religious views of the American majority for those of the secular elite.
Justice Scalia articulated this perspective in Lee v. Weisman.1
28
There, a public school student and her father filed suit seeking a
permanent injunction that would bar public schools from including
religious prayers and benedictions offered by clergy (in the respondents'
case, a rabbi) at graduation ceremonies. 129  The Court held that the
Establishment Clause prohibits public schools from incorporating clergy
and their prayers in graduation ceremonies because of the "particular risk
of indirect coercion" and the perception that a "state-created orthodoxy"
arises when government appears to sanction religious exercise. 130
In his dissent from the majority opinion, which he called
"conspicuously bereft of any reference to. history,"' 3 1 Justice Scalia
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003). "Let me be clear that I have
nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal
democratic means .... But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to be
made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best." Id.
124. Because this section focuses on Scalia's attitude rather than his approach, I'll
highlight here the manner in which he engages in these often divisive debates, and leave
the substance of his positions for a later section in the paper.
125. In the "Faithful Servant" section below, I will look more closely at
homosexuality, which certainly could have been included in this section.
126. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAw. L.
REv. 449, 449-50 (2000).
127. Steven Goldberg, Antonin Scalia, Baruch Spinoza, and the Relationship
Between Church and State, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 653 (2002).
128. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
129. Id. at 580-84.
130. Id. at 592.
131. Id. at631.
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wrote:
the Court-with nary a reference that it is doing so-lays waste a tradition
that is as old as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves .... As its
instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, the Court
invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological
coercion .... 132
According to Scalia, public expression of gratitude to God represents a
long-standing constitutionally protected tradition and promotes tolerance
among a religiously pluralistic citizenry.' 33 Deeply troubled that the
majority, "oblivious to our history,"' 34 perceived a nondenominational
prayer offered at a middle school graduation by a Reform Jewish rabbi as
an instrument of coercion, Scalia viewed the majority opinion not merely
as poorly reasoned law but as thinly-veiled social engineering, a means
of hastening religion's displacement from the American public square.
Scalia wrote an even more vociferous rejection of the majority's
take on religion in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet.'35  In Kiryas Joel, several taxpayers and the
association of state school boards brought suit claiming that a specific
New York state school districting law, which drew the boundaries of the
Kiryas Joel school district precisely along the boundaries of the Village
of Kiryas Joel, offended the Establishment Clause because the village
was a religious enclave of the Satmar Hasidim, an Orthodox Jewish
community described by Justice David Souter as "vigorously religious
people who make few concessions to the modem world and go to great
lengths to avoid assimilation into it.",1 36 The majority regarded the New
York legislature's school districting law as an impermissibly non-neutral
establishment of the state's civic authority in a particular religious
community.137
Accusing the majority of abandoning both constitutional text and
American tradition,' 38 Scalia dissented, arguing that the school district's
population only incidentally shared the same religion 39 and that the New
York legislature did not favor the Satmar Hasidim in its creation of the
132. Id. at 631-32.
133. Id. at 646.
134. Id. at 633.
135. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
136. Id. at 691.
137. Id. at 696, 703.
138. Id. at 732.
139. Id. at 733.
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school district. "The Court's decision today is astounding .... [The
decision] continues, and takes to new extremes, a recent tendency in the
opinions of this Court to turn the Establishment Clause into a repealer of
our Nation's tradition of religious toleration.' ' 40  Almost tauntingly,
Scalia critiques Justice Souter's majority opinion:
I have little doubt that Justice Souter would laud this humanitarian
legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the students of Kiryas Joel were
attributable to the fact that their parents were nonreligious commune
dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies. The creation of a special, one-
culture school district for the benefit of those children would pose no
problem. The neutrality demanded by the Religion Clauses requires the
same indulgence towards cultural characteristics that are accompanied by
religious belief.141
The majority, Scalia suggests, actively disfavors deeply committed
religious believers and religious practice. Those who "go to great
lengths to avoid assimilation" into the modem world are subject to an
especially suspicious gaze by the majority. Scalia reserves a distinctive
degree of scorn for Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, which expressed
concern that the Satmar Hasidic children's "isolation". "unquestionably
increased the likelihood that they would remain within the fold, faithful
adherents of their parents' faith. ' ' 142 "So much for family values," Scalia
writes. 143 Scalia calls Stevens' opinion a "manifesto of secularism"
which "announces a positive hostility to religion-which, unlike all other
noncriminal values, the State must not assist parents in transmitting to
their offspring."'
144
What is distinctively fundamentalist about these dissents 145 is the
140. Id. at 752.
141. Id. at 741.
142. Id. at711.
143. Id. at 749.
144. Id.
145. Other cases in this area where Scalia, in dissent, hinted at the majority's anti-
religious inclinations include Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610, 634 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending the constitutionality of the Louisiana legislature's
Balanced Treatment Act, which provided for the teaching of "creation-science" in
addition to "evolution-science," and expressing astonishment at the Court's "instinctive
reaction that any governmentally-imposed requirements bearing upon the teaching of
evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamentalist repression," finding
instead that "the Court's position is the repressive one"); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
733 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (holding constitutional a state scholarship plan that
barred theology students:
One need not delve too far into modem popular culture to perceive a trendy
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extent to which Scalia views religion as marginalized, disfavored, and
under assault, despite its preeminent position in the Bill of Rights and
American history. In these dissents, Scalia emerges both as a defender of
religious practice and of religion more broadly.1 46 Where his colleagues
and contemporary culture display a willingness to attack religion, Scalia
emerges to shield it from their secular assault.
Scalia reserves some of his most antagonistic salvos for his
opponents in the battle over judicially recognized abortion in the three
decades since the Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade 14 7 decision. I want to focus
on two strains in his opinions in the Court's abortion cases: one, the
consequences of the Court's involvement in determining abortion's
nationwide legality, and two, his own visionary attributes. First, as to
institutional legitimacy, Justice Scalia stresses that federal courts should
remain out of the field entirely, ceding determination of a woman's right
to have an abortion to the state-by-state political process.' 14 The Roe
Court, Scalia believes, "sought to establish-in the teeth of a clear,
contrary tradition-a value found nowhere in the constitutional text.,
149
The Court's decisions over the past generation have made "a democratic
vote by nine lawyers" dispositive, at a nationwide level, on policy
choices regarding what limits to place on abortion. 50 And a majority of
Scalia's own colleagues submit to the continuing temptation toward
"systematically eliminating checks upon its own power.' 15' If the Court
continues down the path of injecting itself into this policy determination
without reference to constitutional or statutory text, or the country's
traditions, it will inevitably impose itself on other areas of policy
reserved to the political process. 52  Before even entering the moral
disdain for deep religious conviction. In an era when the Court is so quick to come
to the aid of other disfavored groups (citation omitted), its indifference in this case,
which involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually speaks,
is exceptional).
Id.
146. He is a defender of legal religious practices, not those that offend otherwise
generally applicable neutral laws like that in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). This position, interestingly, has occasionally pitted Justice Scalia's commitment
to rule-of-law values against religious conservatives' desire to extend the protection
afforded to religious believers.
147. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
148. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
1000-01 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 980 n.1.
150. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Casey, 505 U.S. at981.
152. Id. at 1000.
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debate over abortion, then, Justice Scalia conjures a doomsday scenario
for the country because of the Court's behavior.
More perilously for the nation and itself, according to Justice Scalia,
the Court paints an "unrecognizable" portrait of Roe as a resolution,
rather than a detonation, of the national abortion issue.
153
[T]o portray Roe as the statesmanlike "settlement" of a divisive issue, a
jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving, is nothing less
than Orwellian. Roe fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national
politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices
to this Court in particular, ever since.
15 4
Instead of overruling Roe, and sending the issue back for state-by-
state determination, the Court makes a virtue of its purported
"constancy," of "remain[ing] steadfast, of adhering to "principle.' '155
This is not consistency, but a kind of deliberate misrepresentation, Scalia
asserts, through which the Court depicts itself as remaining faithful to
precedent, when instead it remains committed only to its own self-
destructive power grab. "The Imperial Judiciary lives," Scalia writes.
156
"[T]he notion that the Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the
decision faces 'great opposition' and the Court is 'under fire' acquires a
character of almost czarist arrogance.' 57 Value judgments are best and
most appropriately made by the people and their elected representatives,
not the appointed members of a life tenured judiciary.158
Throughout these opinions, Scalia spotlights his own predictive-in
some places, he may be said to aspire to prophetic-powers about the
Court's decision-making. In emphasizing the inevitably apocalyptic
consequences of the Court's current behavior, he casts the majority as
engaging in a form of constitutional deviance to secure their own
institutional power.' 59 He stands for the people, 60 as a jurist interested
153. Id. at 995.
154. Id. at 995-96.
155. Id. at 997.
156. Id. at 996.
157. Id. at 999.
158. Id. at 1001; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 924, 955-56 (2000).
159. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 955-56.
While I am in an I-told-you-so mood, I must recall my bemusement, in Casey, at
the joint opinion's expressed belief that Roe v. Wade, "had call[ed] the contending
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution,"... and that the decision in Casey
would ratify that happy truce ... I cannot understand why those who acknowledge
that, in the opening words of Justice O'Connor's concurrence, "the issue of
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solely in ascertaining objective law, and more portentously, on the right
side of history.
61
This stark, Manichean depiction of the near future is a trademark of
the fundamentalist outlook. The world as presently constituted stands at
the precipice, and only a revival of traditional norms and a resurgence in
the authority of the past can prevent the world from falling apart. Justice
Scalia's articulated outlook is not much different: if the Court and the
American legal community follows him, his legal methodology, and the
rules it imposes, their existence will be assured; by moving in the
opposite direction, the Court, and the legal establishment more broadly,
head toward self-destruction.
B. Faithful Servant
The fundamentalist outlook is persuasive and galvanizing to its
adherents not merely because it confronts a chaotic, apparently
unraveling modem world, but also because it claims to have the
exclusive answer for how to put it back together. The fundamentalist
outlook frames itself as the restorer of the stability and simplicity of an
earlier age. Fundamentalists assert their perspectives are authoritative
because they aim to retrieve, not remake. Their claims are self-evident
and represent the established order of things. By remaining faithful to
original sources of meaning, fundamentalists commit themselves to
stability in a time of flux, and objectivity in a time of relativism.
In his fealty to text and his deference to tradition, Justice Scalia
understands himself to be a faithful servant to constitutional text, the
original meaning provided by the Constitution's ratifiers (along with
statute-enacting legislatures), and to the long-standing traditions of the
American people. Scalia, as well as his commentators, have rooted this
"faithful servant" aspect of Scalia's judicial personality in a number of
different sources, among them in his repudiation of the vague,
abortion is one of the most contentious and controversial in contemporary
American society,"... persist in the belief that this Court, armed with neither
constitutional text nor accepted tradition, can resolve that contention and
controversy rather than be consumed by it.
Id.
160. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 ("The people know that their value judgments are
quite as good as those taught in law school-maybe better.").
161. Scalia begins his Carhart dissent by stating: "I am optimistic enough to
believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history
of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott." 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
25
PACE LA WREVIEW
democracy-defeating methodology advocated by "Living Constitution"
acolytes; 162 in his pre-Vatican II Catholic upbringing; 163 and in a Burkean
traditionalism. 64 In this section of the paper, I will describe Justice
Scalia's commitment to the interpretative approach of textualism (in the
constitutional context, originalism) and the privileged place he gives
tradition in his jurisprudence. I will look at the various approaches he
uses to proclaim his textual fidelity to the law. I will argue that given his
claims of fidelity, his professed neutrality, and his sought-after
simplicity, Scalia's approach to interpretation closely parallels the
interpretive project of a religious fundamentalist.
1. Commitment to Textualism
Justice Scalia is probably the most prominent proponent and
practitioner of textualism (in the constitutional context, originalism). In
his own words, "[t]he theory of originalism treats a constitution like a
statute, and gives it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at
the time they were promulgated."1 65 According to this theory, judges
evaluating constitutional (and statutory) claims are charged with homing
in, first and foremost, on the text of the constitutional provision. Where
the text is clear, the judge follows its plain meaning; where the text is
vague, the judge defers to its original meaning. 166 The judge, according
to Scalia, is duty-bound to follow the text.1 67  The judge must avoid
importing her own personal predilections into the text, because judges
lack the institutional authority to pursue their own policy preferences or
independently formulate their own laws.168 Textualism does not demand
strict constructionism-"a degraded form of textualism that brings the
whole philosophy into disrepute"' 69 -but calls instead for the reasonable
construction of the legal text.' 70  Textualism, then, requires judicial
objectivity, not literalism.
162. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 42.
163. Kannar, Constitutional Catechism, supra note 7, at 1315.
164. See David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1699, 1707 (1991).
165. Scalia, Remarks, supra note 10, at 1.
166. Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25, 29 (1994).
167. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 22 ("The text is the law, and it is
the text that must be observed.").
168. Seeid. at98.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Chief among the virtues of textualism is that it removes the
individual judge from inventing, instead of interpreting, the law. Scalia
writes:
Besides being accused of being simplistic, textualism is often accused of
being "formalistic." The answer to that is, of course it's formalistic! The
rule of law is about form... Long live formalism. It is what makes a
government a government of laws and not of men.17
This is the core of what Professor Cass Sunstein calls Scalia's
democratic formalism. 7 2 Constraints on judges, among them clear rules
and their own, self-binding interpretive methodologies, ensure that the
voices of the people are not muzzled by an elite judiciary.' 73 For Scalia,
anything other than originalism, as noted earlier, will precipitate the end
of the rule of law and the crowning of a kind of "judicial aristocracy."'174
What is worse, according to Justice Scalia, is that putative judicial
aristocrats no longer conceal their intentions. He writes:
It may surprise the layman, but it will surely not surprise the lawyers here,
to learn that originalism is not, and had perhaps never been, the sole
method of constitutional exegesis. It would be hard to count on the fingers
of both hands and the toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one's
youthful head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis
of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what judges
currently thought it desirable to mean .... [I]n the past, nonoriginalist
opinions have almost always had the decency to lie, or at least to
dissemble, about what they were doing .... It is only in relatively recent
years, however, that nonoriginalist exegesis has, so to speak, come out of
the closet, and put itself forward overtly as an intellectually legitimate
device. 175
Where the current judicial ethos permits, indeed encourages, judges
to make the law, Scalia's textualism purports to remove, insofar as is
possible, the judge from determination of the law. The judge should
function, in a role propounded by Thomas Jefferson, as a "mere
machine" who interprets statutes in order to effect the popular will. 176 As
171. See id. at 99-100.
172. Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
530 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
173. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 38.
174. Richey, supra note 114.
175. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 852.
176. Gordon S. Wood, Comment to SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at
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a result, the textualist will not succumb to the ascendant ethos that views
the Constitution as "evolving" and "living."' 177  A dead Constitution
cannot "suggest changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to
prevent change-to embed certain rights in such a manner that future
generations cannot take them away."' 178 By freezing the meaning of the
Constitution in time, Scalia believes the textualist honors the
Constitution and protects long-standing constitutional rights.
Promoting this neutral objectivity is a primary goal of the originalist
project. "[O]riginalism has been modem American legal culture's chief
means of infusing the nation's founding political document with an
objective authority that modernism refuses to concede."' 179  Like the
religious fundamentalist, Scalia the originalist pits textual interpretation
as a confrontation between the unmoored modernist and the faithful
traditionalist. Thus, the textualist is portrayed by Scalia as dispassionate,
reasonable, and apolitical, reading the text only for what it "fairly"
means rather than what he thinks it should mean.' 80  Here, as noted
earlier, the textualist as legal fundamentalist perceives himself as
obedient and objective, reverent toward history and reasonable toward
text.
2. Use of Dictionaries
Justice Scalia's textualism places a distinct emphasis on the
formalistic study and application of words. 181 One device Justice Scalia
uses to establish his textual fidelity is his repeated reference to
dictionaries, especially those from the era of the framers, along with
ancient sources and words' etymological roots, to discern the contents of
original meaning. Two cases dealing with the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause offer useful examples.
In Maryland v. Craig, the Court considered whether the
Confrontation Clause categorically prohibits a child witness in a child
sex abuse case from offering testimony against the defendant outside the
defendant's physical presence (here by way of one-way closed circuit
television). 82 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not
177. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 38.
178. See id. at 114.
179. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 32, 99 (1993).
180. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 29.
181. Kannar, Constitutional Catechism, supra note 7, at 1307.
182. 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990).
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guarantee criminal defendants an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting
with witnesses against them at trial when an important public policy
(here, protecting child witnesses from the trauma attendant to testifying
in child abuse cases) is implicated.183
Justice Scalia dissented. He accused the majority of a
"conspicuous" failure "to sustain a categorical guarantee of the
Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion,"' 184 and of
undermining the Sixth Amendment's "literal, unavoidable text."'185 To
counter the Court's argument likening its analysis to that used in cases
dealing with the admission of hearsay evidence, Scalia consulted An
American Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1828, and
Linguae Britannicae Vera Pronunciatio, published in 1757, to establish
the meaning of the word "witness" in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment
was adopted.
86
Two years earlier, in Coy v. Iowa,' 87 the Court adjudicated whether
the Confrontation Clause guaranteed the petitioner, convicted in an Iowa
state court of two counts of lascivious acts with a child, the right to a
face-to-face confrontation with his accusers. 188 There, writing for the
majority, Scalia wrote that the plain text of the Sixth Amendment
required that a criminal defendant have the right to a face-to-face
confrontation with witnesses testifying against him at trial. 89 To support
this opinion, Scalia cited the New Testament's Book of Acts (25:16),
Shakespeare's Richard II (Act I, Sc. 1), as well as the Latin roots of
"confrontation.' 90
However, scholars observe that during the eighteenth, nineteenth,
and much of the twentieth centuries, many general English language
dictionaries were prescriptive, not descriptive: they offered the reader the
lexicographer's recommendations about how a word should be used,
183. Id. at 857.
184. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 863.
186. Id. at 864-65.
187. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
188. Id. at 1014-15 (Pursuant to a 1985 state statute meant to protect child victims
of sex abuse, the Iowa state court had granted the State's motion that a screen be placed
between the accused and the alleged victims which allowed him to hear his accusers, but
see them only dimly).
189. Id.
190. Justice Scalia wrote that a face-to-face meeting was implicit in "confrontation"
based on its ordinary English usage, as well as its Latin origins, "since the word
'confront' ultimately derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or
'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)." Id. at 1015-17.
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
rather than illustrating the way the word was used in practice.' 9 '
Furthermore, these dictionaries were littered with obsolete words and
meanings, which the lexicographer hoped to restore to the language.'
92
In addition, there are dozens, if not hundreds of dictionaries to reference
to find the meaning one seeks. 193 Because these dictionaries did not
aspire to descriptive impartiality, they are imprecise, somewhat
ineffective, instruments to use to divine the original meaning of words
employed by the framers. 194 Nevertheless, resorting to them creates an
aura of authenticity and authority that befits the textualist's interpretative
project.
3. Fidelity to Tradition
Further establishing the conclusive authority of the past in his
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia relies heavily on tradition, especially when
text is insufficient. 195 His emphasis of tradition represents both Scalia's
deference to the past for legal standards, as well as a more personal,
almost romantic sense of nostalgia about the "good society" that seems
to "underlie the fatalistic realism about present-day America so evident
in many of Justice Scalia's opinions.' ' 196 In a 1987 article, Scalia drafted
a list of "fortunate" societies-those in which "extraordinarily talented
and virtuous men and women have the good fortune to be associated with
enough others to form a critical mass, [a]nd something wonderful
happens"-which included Pericles' Athens, Cicero's Rome, Dante's
Florence, and George Washington's United States. 197 His affinity for
those communities, and the primacy he gives to tradition in his opinions,
spotlights the wisdom of the past as well as the chaos of the present.
Yet distinctive in his respect for social tradition is his occasional
aversion to stare decisis. Scalia's willingness to disregard legal
precedent is frequent and wide-ranging.' 98  Scalia does not believe it
191. Rickie Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2177, 2182 (2003).
192. Id. at2212.
193. Id. at 2198 (during the 1997-1998 Term, the Court's Justices cited to 120
different dictionaries).
194. Id. at 2188-89.
195. Strauss, supra note 164, at 1705.
196. George Kannar, Strenuous Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision of
Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1845, 1848 (1991).
197. Antonin Scalia, The Limits of the Law, 119 N.J. L.J. 736 (1987).
198. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (expressing desire to overrule Roe v. Wade); Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc.,
[Vol. 26:445
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/3
2006] JUDICIAL PERSONA OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 475
necessary to disassemble what he considers erroneously decided
precedent "doorjamb by doorjamb;"' 199 rather, he prefers to challenge
explicitly those precedents he would overrule.200  Professor David A.
Strauss explained this apparent tension in a 1990-91 article:
[I]n fact there is no paradox. Precedent overlaps tradition; it is not
subsumed by it. Some precedents may be said to be part of a tradition. But
not all are. Some are simply the decisions of a group of judges rendered a
few years ago. Burke's injunction-not to cast aside the accumulated
wisdom of generations, gained through trial and error, in favor of
abstractions-does not call for such precedents to be sustained. On the
contrary, it calls for them to be discarded.
20 1
Seen from this light, tradition represents the culture's received,
cumulative wisdom whereas precedent amounts simply to a judge's (or
court's) particular case determination. Moreover, while tradition gains
strength as it ages, precedent often loses weight over time.202
Scalia's reverence for tradition and frequent disinclination to follow
stare decisis gains additional clarity within the context of his
fundamentalist judicial persona. Scalia's iconoclastic, confrontational
side emerges when he challenges precedent. His obedient, reverential
side surfaces when he defends tradition. In his book, Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law, Robert Bork wrote that in law, as in
theology, "the main bulwark against heresy [is] only tradition., 20 3 Where
established traditions run counter to current norms, but judges privilege
the current norms anyway, Scalia believes they commit a form of judicial
heresy. Indeed, when judges make decisions based on their personal
predilections rather than the objective meaning of the law, they also
commit judicial heresy, according to Justice Scalia. Through his
traditionalism, then, Justice Scalia works as a kind of doctrinal defender
of the faith. The stridency of his tone, the ridicule in his attacks, and the
assuredness of his approach all contribute to the sense that the fate of
American rule of law hinges on fidelity to text and tradition.
501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that, despite Court
precedents, nude dancing deserves no constitutional protection); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 611 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling into question the first prong of
the test used to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges in dissent).
199. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537.
200. Gerhardt, supra note 166, at 125.
201. Strauss, supra note 164, at 1706.
202. David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (1991).
203. ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10
(1984).
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Indeed, in an article written for the religion journal First Things in
which Justice Scalia explained his belief in the constitutionality of the
death penalty through the prism of his Catholic faith, he framed his
perspective as more faithful to Catholic tradition than Pope John Paul
II's, a famously tradition-minded pontiff.2°4 Justice Scalia grounds his
argument in St. Paul's Letter to the Romans 13:1-5. There, Paul
enunciated the belief that a government derives its moral authority from
God. Quoting the passage from Romans, Justice Scalia writes: "[The
state] is the 'minister of God' with powers to 'revenge,' to 'execute
wrath,' including even wrath by the sword., 20 5 The verses from Romans
represent the Western consensus until very recently, according to Justice
Scalia, and the "emergence of democracy" has fissured this consensus;
yet when viewed over the long arc of history, those who disapprove of
the legality and morality of the death penalty are the anomalies, rather
than those who do.2 °6 Moreover, the modem world features a "greatly
increased capacity for evil. 2 °7  Pope John Paul II's encyclical
Evangelium Vitae, in Scalia's view, is wrong, and misrepresents the
weight of Catholic tradition and teaching on the permissibility of the
death penalty.2 °8 The article concludes with a swipe at the Vatican itself:
"We need some new staffers at the Congregation of Prudence in the
Vatican. At least the new doctrine should have been urged only upon
secular Europe, where it is at home. 20 9
His fidelity to tradition emerges prominently in a number of the
Court's cases dealing with traditional sexual practices. For example, in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,210 the putative natural father of a son conceived
in an adulterous relationship brought suit, challenging as a violation of
204. Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17
[hereinafter Scalia, God's Justice]. Professor George Kannar, in his article The
Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, attributes, in significant part, Justice Scalia's
penchant for rules and textualism to his religious roots. Kannar, Constitutional
Catechism, supra note 7, at 1310. A traditional Catholic education, buttressed by the
literalism preached by his father, an academic and literary translator who believed that
"to avoid destroying 'what is unique' in reading any text, 'literalism is ... essential,"' Id.
at 1316 (citing S.E. SCALIA, CARDUCCI: His CRITICS AND His TRANSLATORS IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA, 1881-1932 90 (1937)), stressed the necessity of fidelity to text.
"Following the 'original' Constitution and all its corollary precedential 'rules' provides
a... way of proving that one is 'strong enough to obey."' Id. at 1320.
205. Scalia, God's Justice, supra note 204, at 19.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 20.
208. Id. at 21.
209. Id.
210. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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substantive due process a California statute that presumed that a child
born to a woman who lived with her husband was the husband's child.211
Authoring a plurality opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the petitioner's suit,
holding that the substantive part of the due process clause only protects
interests "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 21 2 To
determine this, Scalia looks to the presumption of natural paternal
legitimacy in common law and cites texts from 1569, 1826, and 1836.213
The tradition at issue, Scalia writes, is not the general parental rights of
parents, but the far more specific tradition of whether putative natural
fathers may secure visitation rights to their children born into an extant
marital family.214 "[T]he claim that a State must recognize multiple
fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this country. 21 5
American law affords a "sanctity" to the "unitary family, 21 6 and while
Scalia concedes that the contemporary family takes different forms than
what was conventional 200 or even 40 years ago, the notion of family
forfeits its established meaning and its constitutional support when it
strays too far from traditional conceptions.217 The Constitution's Due
Process Clause is designed to entrench "important traditional values"
rather than to permit the Court to "invent new ones. 21 8
Scalia concentrates some of his most inflamed defense of tradition
for several of the Court's cases in the area of homosexuality. In the 1996
case of Romer v. Evans, the Court held that a Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting all legislative, judicial, and executive actions
undertaken to protect homosexual individuals from discrimination
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 9 The amendment, the Court
stated, imposed a special disability exclusively on homosexual persons
for no discernible reason other than "animus toward the class it
affects. 220  Justice Scalia "vigorously dissent[ed]. 221 Misreading the
amendment as born of hostility rather than deep-seated values, the Court,
211. Id. at 113-14.
212. Id. at 124.
213. Id. at 124-25.
214. Id. at 129.
215. Id. at 131.
216. Id. at 123.
217. Id. at 124 n.3.
218. Id. at 123 n.2.
219. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
220. Id. at 632.
221. Id. at 636.
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222he wrote, had unconscionably taken sides in an ongoing culture war.
In so doing it both disregarded recent precedent, and more
comprehensively, razed a body of legal and cultural tradition-part of
the country's "moral heritage" 223-in existence since "the founding of
the Republic": moral disapproval of homosexual conduct expressed
through a criminal prohibition on the behavior.224
Justice Scalia spends a good part of his opinion highlighting the
democratic pedigree of the Colorado amendment, and how the Court's
opinion subverts basic majoritarian principles. 225 He also states that it is
neither his nor the Court's business "to take sides in this culture war."226
Yet his legal argument seems, in some respects, like a sidebar to the
propulsive outrage explicit in his opinion. The Court, he writes, has
taken sides in the culture war,
by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes. To
suggest, for example, that this constitutional amendment springs from
nothing more than "a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group
(citations omitted)" is nothing short of insulting. 27
Justice Scalia appears to take very personally what he reads as the
Court's branding of tradition as bigotry.
The same note of personal outrage about the abandonment of
tradition is apparent in his equally strong dissent in Lawrence v. Texas.228
There, the Court explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick229 and held as
violative of the Due Process Clause a Texas statute which criminalized
two persons of the same sex engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct.
Anticipating, or at least responding, to Justice Scalia's argument about
long-standing tradition, the Court stated that the traditions and laws most
relevant to its decision were those of the past half century which
demonstrated "an emerging awareness" about the liberty interests
afforded people in their private conduct.23 ° Justice Scalia rejected this as
historically short-sighted and institutionally devastating: "homosexual
222. Id. "[The amendment represents] a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradoans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically
powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." Id.
223. Id. at 644.
224. Id. at 640, 644.
225. Id. at 647.
226. Id. at 652.
227. Id.
228. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
230. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
[Vol. 26:445
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/3
2006] JUDICIAL PERSONA OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
sodomy is not a right 'deeply rooted in our Nation's history and
tradition,' ' 231 and the Court, acting as a "governing caste" had "largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda., 232 Thus, the Court had
strayed not merely from the Nation's traditions, but from the tradition of
neutrality that Justice Scalia believes is at or near the core of its
institutional identity. The Court had "laid waste" to a part of its existing
jurisprudence,233 and effectively announced the end of morals legislation
by ruling that the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality did not
amount to a legitimate state interest.
234
These opinions represent the voice of a legal fundamentalist, and
not merely an aggrieved dissenter, because Justice Scalia is at once
defensive and accusatory, protective of the country's moral tradition and
condemnatory of his colleagues' scornful treatment of it. What emerges
in these opinions is the sense that Justice Scalia writes these opinions as
finger-wagging homilies to the Court and, more broadly, the culture.
When the Court strays from its traditional role as "neutral observer,"
235
the hortatory nature of Scalia's dissents appear designed to reproach the
Court for its deviations. The Court, he writes, has taken sides, having
effectively been captured by "some homosexual activists" who aim to
"eliminate[e] the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to
homosexual conduct., 236  The Court is now politicized-no longer
neutral, no longer faithful to tradition, representing now "the lawyer
class" '237 whose attitudes may be contrasted with "the more plebian
attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress', 238 -
and thus it seems only a matter of time before its forewarned
deterioration will occur.
C. World Transformer
Justice Scalia's "fundamentalist" style extends beyond his
vociferous dissents and his castigation of intellectual and ideological
adversaries. Indeed, his style is "fundamentalist" in that he actively
seeks to persuade citizens, colleagues on the Court, and the legal
231. Id. at 596.
232. Id. at 602, 604.
233. Id. at 604.
234. Id. at 599.
235. Id. at 602.
236. Id.
237. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 653.
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profession more broadly of the rightness of his views. Where this "faith
in the correctness of his views'239 arose from-his Catholic faith, his
formalist upbringing, his intellectual self-assurance, the adulation (and
condemnation) he receives from large swaths of the public-is of little
consequence for this paper. What is relevant is that Justice Scalia has
self-consciously sought, and in incremental steps has begun to attain, a
sea change in the American legal establishment. This section spotlights
Justice Scalia's commitment to transform American legal culture.
Disdainful of modem methods of interpretation, antagonistic toward
what (and who) he views as the legal and cultural elite, and committed to
text and tradition as ultimate (and effectively exclusive) sources of
meaning, Justice Scalia has pursued this transformation actively and
publicly. Justice Scalia distinguishes himself from his colleagues
because he communicates directly to the American public: at student
assemblies, bar association events, faith-based community gatherings,
and in print. Insofar as his fellow Justices have been reluctant to adopt
his methodological approach, he has stumped for adoption of that
approach throughout the country, becoming to some "not just a
politicized judge but a true politician., 240  In seeking to mobilize his
"troops," as it were, Justice Scalia's legal mission is, in many respects, a
fundamentalist kind of endeavor: the world is in trouble, its prevailing
standards breed moral and political disorder, and transformation of the
world as it is remains possible only through doggedly pursuing a
recovery of the world as it was (or as the fundamentalist believes it to
have been).
Notably, observers of the Court detect a "radical,,
241 
"embattled," 242
and "marginalized" 243 Scalia, and speculate that his judicial mission
amounts to a political failure.2 " In fact, however, Justice Scalia has
already been successful at converting people to his message and his
245vision. Moreover, his failures at persuasion might be even more
239. Kannar, Constitutional Catechism, supra note 7, at 1309.
240. Zlotnick, supra note 85, at 1427-28.
241. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Gavel Rousers; Farewell to the Old Order in
the Court, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1995, at El.
242. Kunen, supra note 79.
243. Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of a Term-A Special Report; In Supreme Court's
Decisions, A Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1996, at A20.
244. See Talbot, supra note 10, at 52.
245. A 1997 essay in THE NEW REPUBLIC evaluated Scalia's impact through his first
eleven years on the Court:
Scalia joined the Court in 1986, and it is a little startling to reflect on how
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significant than his successes, because through these failures he cements
his self-described position on the legal margins. The fundamentalist in
Scalia savors his place outside the mainstream, and uses these rejections
as a platform to reaffirm his own methodological commitments and to
decry prevailing legal and social standards.
Justice Scalia's transformational impact can be viewed in several
different categories. In the realm of interpretation, the Court's justices
increasingly rely on textualist readings of statutes and the Constitution to
shape their opinions; a corollary to the preceding change surfaces in the
emerging stigma attached to legislative history. At the organizational
level, groups and institutions formed over the past two decades comprise
a new generation of followers of Justice Scalia's legal methodology.
This in turn has had an ideological impact, as the federal judiciary has
experienced an unprecedented politicization over the past generation.
While Scalia deplores this trend and stresses that judges must restrain
themselves and concede law-making power to the country's politically
accountable bodies, his combative judicial persona has fueled this
trend.246
1. Converting the Court to Textualism
Justice Scalia has had an undeniable impact on the way the current
Court tackles the interpretation of legal texts. Professor Cass Sunstein
writes:
[Legal fundamentalists] think that constitutional interpretation requires an
act of rediscovery. Their goal is to return to what they see as the essential
source of constitutional meaning: the views of those who ratified the
document .... They know that current constitutional law does not reflect
their own views, and they tend to be angry about that fact. For this reason,
fundamentalists have radical inclinations; they seek to make large-scale
changes in constitutional law.2 4
7
dramatically he and the movement that he personifies have transformed the terms
of constitutional debate. As a justice, Scalia seems increasingly frustrated, and his
dissents grow lonelier and more acerbic with the passage of time. But if Scalia's
substantive views often fail to carry the day, his methodological victory is nearly
complete: in famous cases and in obscure ones, liberal and conservative justices
find themselves debating the intricacies of eighteenth-century history.
Rosen, supra note 107, at 26-27.
246. Talbot, supra note 10, at 48.
247. CASS SuNsTEIN, FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG: How EXTREMISTS ARE
TRANSFORMING THE COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 19 (manuscript of RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY ExTREME RIGHT WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)) (on file
37
PACE LAWREVIEW
In particular, Justice Scalia has pilloried the judicial search for a
legislature's original intent.
You will find it frequently said in judicial opinions of my court and others
that the judge's objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
"intent of the legislature." [A] legal system that determines the meaning of
laws on the basis of what was meant rather than what was said is...
tyrannical.
248
Scalia's critique of this interpretative method represents a "radical, as
opposed to marginal... rethinking of the Court's role. 249 Confronted
with their colleague's withering contempt of original intent as unreliable
and undemocratic, the Court has increasingly followed Scalia.
2. Dwindling Role for Legislative History
Before Scalia joined the Court in 1986, justices reviewed a law's
legislative history in nearly all statutory cases.250  Between 1980 and
1998, the number of citations to legislative history dropped from 479 to
79, a decrease of 85.5 percent.251 In this respect, the Court's current use
reflects a return to the era where originalism was "constitutional
orthodoxy:" in 1938, the Court's opinions contained only nineteen
citations to legislative history.252 Reviewing legislative history only
became customary in the decades following the New Deal, as
government expanded, the amount of legislation surged, and judges
enjoyed new opportunities to review legislative materials as government
libraries grew.
253
Shortly after his arrival, Scalia's frontal assault on legislative
history began. In LN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court considered an
alien's appeal for asylum. 4 The relevant provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act indicated that an asylum-seeker's "well-founded fear
with author).
248. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 16-17.
249. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 624.
250. Talbot, supra note 10, at 52.
251. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia 's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 386 (1999).
252. Id. at 386 nn.7-8. The example of the dwindling use of legislative history
demonstrates that Justice Scalia's judicial fundamentalist persona is not confined to
inflammatory dissents on combustible political issues. It is not merely a "loser's
rhetoric." Rather, its stridency seeks transformative change. Here, that stridency has
largely achieved its sought-after goals.
253. Id. at 371-72.
254. 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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of persecution" only required a showing that the fear was reasonable,
rather than clearly probable, as the I.N.S. asserted. 5  The Court, despite
noting the "ordinary and obvious meaning" of the phrase at issue,
nevertheless proceeded through a lengthy analysis of the provision's
legislative history, which confirmed the Court's understanding of the
statute's "ordinary meaning.,
25 6
Concurring in the judgment, but not in the method by which it was
reached, Justice Scalia wrote that the reference to legislative history
constituted "an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if
the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect-at
least in the absence of a patent absurdity., 257 The Court's "exhaustive
investigation of the legislative history of the Act" was unnecessary and
unjustified.258
He has sustained his attacks on the Court's use of legislative history
throughout his term on the Court.259 Scalia grounds his rejection of
legislative history in tradition.260  What makes this strategy
"fundamentalist," rather than merely assertive, is the wholesale change
he demands in the legal establishment (for if it remains on its current
course, it will destroy itself), as well as his confrontational
pronouncements that his views, though rooted in tradition, are
nevertheless dismissed as aberrant and "backward" by the current legal
establishment.
3. Canons of Construction
Another example of his transformative impact, and the scandalous
stances he assumes in the legal world, is his embrace of canons of
construction. In A Matter of Interpretation he writes:
255. Id. at 428-29.
256. Id. at 449.
257. Id. at 452.
258. Id. at 452-53.
259. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
260. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 29-30:
My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the
legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that
legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's
meaning. This was the traditional English, and the traditional American, practice.
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Textualism is often associated with rules of interpretation called the canons
of construction-which have generally been criticized, indeed even
mocked, by modem legal commentators. Many of the canons were
originally in Latin, and I suppose that alone is enough to render them
contemptible.26 1
Before Scalia began to advocate for their return, canons of construction
had regularly been dismissed as arbitrary and ineffective instruments for
statutory interpretation.2 62 Textualists like Scalia, however, have applied
them "with exceptional vigor., 263  Moreover, others on the Supreme
Court followed Scalia's lead in the years following his appointment,
retrieving the canon "'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius' (the inclusion
of one thing implies the exclusion of all others), ' '264 despite the fact that
the canon had "long been the object of academic scorn because it is not a
recognized precept of grammar or logic and poorly reflects the multi-
faceted decision-making structure of Congress. ', 265  What makes the
reintroduction of canons of construction "fundamentalist" rather than
simply old-fashioned is that the traditional device is employed both to
affirm the wisdom of the past as well as to scandalize, inviting the
condescension of the elite.
4. Organizing the Faithful
Justice Scalia's project is "fundamentalist" because it is at core
transformative and political. Convinced that the elite has imprinted its
views on the mainstream, Justice Scalia's jurisprudential approach is at
once a counterattack and a revival. If his approach is evangelical in that
it seeks to persuade and recruit, it is so in part because he perceives the
current legal morass as the result of a conversion campaign begun by his
adversaries.
The American people have been converted to belief in The Living
Constitution, a "morphing" document that means, from age to age, what it
ought to mean. And with that conversion has inevitably come the new
phenomenon of selecting and confirming federal judges, at all levels, on the
261. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
262. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 664.
263. See id. at 665.
264. Id. at 664.
265. Id. See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,46,47
n.22 (1989) (Brennan, J.); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 585
(1989) (O'Connor, J.); Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489
U.S. 527, 533 (1988) (White, J.).
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basis of their views regarding a whole series of proposals for constitutional
evolution.
266
To repel that conversion campaign to the "Living Constitution,"
Scalia has spearheaded an organized legal counterpoint. The most
prominent manifestation of this effort is the growth of the Federalist
Society, which Justice Scalia has been an advisor to since its inception.267
Fundamentalist movements place special emphasis on community-
building and political organization, especially among young people, to
counter the accepted (and/or presumed) orthodoxy of the general culture.
In similar ways, the Federalist Society represents an organized
counterattack on what its members believe to be the prevailing norms-
political, interpretative, and cultural-of the legal world. The Federalist
Society at once acknowledges this transformational ambition in its own
materials, 268 and is acknowledged to have this ambition by its critics.
2 69
If the Federalist Society can be regarded as the vanguard of an
attack on the legal establishment, then its mission may be regarded as
fundamentalist both for the scale of its sought-after change, and the
anxious, ideologically charged responses its work incites. Interestingly,
its critics have tended to frame the Federalists as either too marginal to
engage or too conspiratorial to ignore.27' This binary treatment
mirrors that given to Justice Scalia, whose influence on the Court and
legal culture is alternately regarded as peripheral and dominant.
266. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 47 (emphasis added).
267. Terry Carter, The In Crowd: Conservatives Who Sought Refuge in the
Federalist Society Gain Clout, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 46, 51.
268. In its mission statement, the Federalist Society calls for a sustained challenge
to the "orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform society."
The Federalist Society, http://www.fed-soc.org/ourpurpose.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2006). However, whatever its ideological bent, the Federalist Society regularly hosts fora
where people of different political bents meet to debate the legal issues of the day. By
hosting these events, the Federalist Society notably amplifies the views not only of its
own members, but of its intellectual adversaries, as well.
269. Jeffrey Rosen of George Washington Law School noted the Federalist Society
"deserves credit for transforming the terms of the legal debate." Thomas B. Edsall,
Federalist Society Becomes a Force in Washington, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2001, at
A4.
270. Carter, supra note 267, at 50.
271. Id.; see also EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL AND
FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (1999), a book written by former law clerk for
Justice Harry Blackmun Edward Lazarus, who though he observed a "cabal" of
conservative law clerks working at the court, said that "liberals make a terrible mistake
when, instead of engaging these folks on the merits, they overemphasize some kind of
conspiracy theory."
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Not unlike Justice Scalia, the Federalist Society professes neutrality.
The Society maintains that, at an institutional level, it "remains above the
political and legislative fray," taking no official positions and refraining
from lobbying and advocating on behalf of judicial nominees. 272  Its
public commitment to neutrality belies its conservative and libertarian
reputation, and its commitment to reconfigure the federal courts in its
own image.273 As Scalia himself has said, "I am not happy about the
intrusion of politics into the judicial appointment process .... Frankly,
however, I prefer it to the alternative, which is government by judicial
aristocracy. '274  For Scalia, then, grassroots movement-building, as it
were, is the antidote to the present tilt toward "judicial aristocracy."
IV. Conclusion
On Sunday, April 24, 2005, at the Highview Baptist Church in
Louisville, Kentucky, a number of conservative Christian leaders, joined
in video simulcast by Sen. Bill Frist, protested what they view as an
ongoing and "unprecedented filibuster of people of faith."2 75 According
to Tony Perkins, President of the Family Research Council, activist
judges in the federal judiciary have worked stealthily to "rob us of our
Christian heritage and our religious freedoms. 276 Aiming to mobilize
popular support for presidential nominees to the federal bench who are
strict constructionists and not activists,277 the event's organizers claimed
that these nominees were being blocked "because they are people of faith
and moral conviction., 278  When questions emerged about Supreme
Court nominee Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.'s ability to partition his
Catholic faith from his interpretation of the Constitution and the laws of
the United States, religious conservatives argued that the inquiry was a
religious litmus test.279 (Moreover, perhaps not unpredictably, whether
272. Edsall, supra note 269, at A4.
273. Carter, supra note 267, at 51: "The society's main focus, beginning in the
Reagan years and continuing today, has been the federal bench."
274. Richey, supra note 114.
275. Tony Perkins, President, Family Research Council, Justice Sunday: Stop the
Filibuster Against People of Faith, (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.frc.org
/get.cfm?i=LH05DO2.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Charles Hurt, Democrats to Delay Roberts Hearings, THE WASH. TIMES, July
26, 2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/nationa/20050726-123009-
8867r.htm.
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Judge Roberts had been a member of the Federalist Society-he said he
could not recall-warranted national media scrutiny.) 280
To the extent that Justice Scalia's judicial persona can be
understood to be "fundamentalist," it is so at least in part because of its
permeation into the political sphere.28 ' While Justice Scalia did not
initiate the politicization of the federal judiciary, he can be said to have
encouraged it.as2  For example, in his 2002 article defending the
constitutionality of the death penalty in First Things, Justice Scalia
encouraged citizens concerned with the undermining of America's
religious heritage to act up.
The reaction of people of faith to this tendency of democracy to obscure the
divine authority behind government should not be resignation to it, but the
resolution to combat it as effectively as possible. We have done that in this
country (and continental Europe has not) by preserving in our public life
many visible reminders that-in the words of a Supreme Court opinion
from the 1940s-"we are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being."
28 3
Fundamentalism is confrontational, self-certain, and committed to
radical change of the status quo. It is also frequently effective. While
the protest against the alleged filibustering of people of faith has not yet
had a demonstrable impact on the nominations process, the protest could
be said to have changed the terms of the political battle. Though the
mainstream may impugn the fundamentalist outlook, its adherents act out
of interpretive certainty, moral clarity, and (when not viewing the world
as irredeemably corrupt) political urgency. From their place on the
280. Charles Lane, Roberts Listed in Federalist Society '97-98 Directory, THE
WASH. POST, July 25, 2005, at Al.
281. Dahlia Lithwick, How Do You Solve the Problem of Scalia, SLATE, Mar. 30,
2006, http://slate.msn.com/id/2138117. Scalia, after having attended a Boston-area
Catholic church for a Red Mass for lawyers and politicians, offered a "chin flick" to a
journalist who asked him how he responded to critics who questioned his impartiality in
light of his Roman Catholic beliefs. Lithwick writes that only Scalia could "trigger a
nationwide debate about the hermenutics of chin flips ... His kiss-off is already being
spun, amazingly, as a justified response to an insulting attack on his religious beliefs.
Scalia is once again the victim, it seems, of cunning liberal attempts to 'make him into
news."'
282. Stephanie Reitz, Scalia Defends Involvement in Cheney Case, THE WASH.
POST, April 13, 2006, at A6. At a speech at the University of Connecticut, Scalia called
his decision not to recuse himself from a 2004 case involving Vice President Dick
Cheney, a personal friend, the "proudest thing" he has done on the court. Responding to
a question from the audience about his impartiality in light of that decision, Scalia said:
"For Pete's sake, if you can't trust your Supreme Court justice more than that, get a life."
283. Scalia, God's Justice, supra note 205, at 19.
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periphery, their political participation changes the mainstream. The
same can be said of Justice Scalia's "fundamentalist" judicial persona.
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